Abstract-An important issue faced by risk analysts is how to deal with uncertainties associated with accident scenarios. In industry, one often uses single values derived fro m historical data or literature to estimate events probability or their frequency. However, both dynamic environments of systems and the need to consider rare component failures may make unrealistic this kind of data. In this paper, uncertainty encountered in Layers Of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is considered in the framework of possibility theory. Data provided by reliability databases and/or experts judgments are represented by fuzzy quantities (possibilit ies). The fu zzy outcome frequency is calculated by extended mu ltip licat ion using α-cuts method. The fu zzy outcome is co mpared to a scenario risk tolerance criteria and the required reduction is obtained by resolving a possibilistic decision-making problem under necessity constraint. In order to validate the proposed model, a case study concerning the protection layers of an operational heater is carried out.
I. Introduction
The problem of reducing risks generated by process industry is a permanent concern of managers and risk experts. In petrochemical industries for instance, there is a wide range of flammab le and to xic materials that have the potential to impact the health and safety of workers and the public, the assets and the environment. Therefore, reducing risks to an acceptable or tolerable level becomes an obligation imposed by social and economic considerations. This aim is usually achieved by using a combination of several safeguards including technical and organizational barriers [1, 2] . Technical safety barriers include Basic Process Control Systems (BPCS), relief systems, dump systems and Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS).
Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA), as described in the IEC 61511 standard [3] , are a semi-quantitative technique for analysing and assessing risk. It can be used at any time in the life cycle of a p rocess or a facility, but it is most frequently used during the design stage or when modificat ions to an existing process or its safety systems should be performed [4] . LOPA is a special form of event tree analysis that is optimized for the purpose of determining the frequency of an unwanted co nsequence which can be prevented by one or more protection layers. This frequency is a risk measure for a scenario and is compared to a maximu m tolerable risk in order to decide whether or not further risk mit igation is needed, according to the principle of "as low as reasonably practicable" (ALARP).
In many systems like chemical process plants, complexity of technologies and human operator tasks increases uncertainty on their behaviour. The more co mplex system the less precise informat ion is availab le, as stated by Zadeh in [5] . Although great efforts based on good scientific knowledge and past experiences are deployed to prevent accident risks, there is still lacking and uncertain informat ion in many parameters and models, especially in the field of rare events like technological major accidents and/or when considering dynamic environments of systems [6, 7] .
In conventional LOPA, nu mbers are usually selected to conservatively estimate failure probabilit ies rather than to closely represent the actual performance of safety barriers. So, the outcome frequency is intended to be conservative and the risk is overestimated with h igher installation and maintenance costs [4, 8] . Another alternative more reassuring and supported by certain experts of system safety, is the use of confidence intervals with lower and upper bounds to quantify failure probabilities [9] [10] [11] [12] . Moreover, several data bases like the one of the Center for Chemical Process Safety [13] , IEEE standard 500 [14] , and OREDA [15] provide such intervals. Although this approach is very well suited for refining worst case analysis with the presence of less pessimistic lower boundaries, it seems that the probability intervals of certain failures are large (e.g. two magnitude orders and more) and not useful in many real world situations and should be readjusted [16] . Furthermore, as for single This paper is organized as follows. Section II addresses an overview of conventional LOPA. Section III focuses on the uncertainty problem in risk assessment. In section IV, we describe the proposed fuzzy LOPA model. Section V deals with a realistic case study, and section VI contains concluding remarks.
II. Conventional Layers of Protection Analysis

General Presentation
LOPA is a simplified risk assessment method, widely used in process industry [4] . Its primary purpose is to determine if there are sufficient layers of protection against a well-defined accident scenario, i.e. if the risk is reduced to a tolerable level. A scenario may require one or more protection layers depending on the process complexity and potential severity of a consequence. Protection layers include passive safeguards (containment, tank of retention, etc) and/or active safeguards (relief valves, SIS, etc.). LOPA is built on informat ion provided by a qualitative hazard analysis such as process hazard analysis (PHA) and Hazards and Operability study (HAZOP).
LOPA is interested only in independent protection layers (IPL). An IPL is a device, system, or action that is capable of preventing an accident scenario independent of the init iating event or the co mponents of any other layers of protection designed for the same scenario. The effectiveness of an IPL is quantified in terms of its probability of failure on demand (PFD)
LOPA Quantification
LOPA is a semi-quantitative method. It typically uses orders of magnitude of the init iating event frequency and the PFD of IPLs to generate a risk frequency estimate of an accident scenario [8, 21] . LOPA can be viewed as a variat ion of event tree analysis that is limited and optimized for the purpose of determining the frequency of an undesired consequence, which can be prevented by one or more protection layers . Whereas an event tree deals with all the possible consequences of an initiat ing event, LOPA focuses on one scenario at time, i.e. a single cause-consequence pair, wh ich represents one path in the event tree as shown by the heavy line in Fig. 1 . Thus, only harmful outcome frequency is usually ever calculated. f is the in itiating event frequency for initiat ing event i ; ij PFD is the probability of failure on demand of the jth IPL that protects against consequence C for initiat ing event i. Equation (1) 
Using LOPA to Make Risk Decision
LOPA is usually practiced to determine whether or not an accident scenario obeys to risk tolerance criteria. The following methods of risk judgment are used in LOPA:
1) The predominant one is to compare the calculated risk with predefined risk criteria. Quantitative risk criteria are preferred by some companies and may be required by law [22] . They may find simple and more convenient to have a nu merical risk criterion expressed in terms of maximu m tolerab le frequency per scenario [4, 23] .
In its publication "Reducing Risks, Protecting People" [24] , Health and Safety Executive in UK retained, for non-nuclear industrial p lants, the individual risk cr iteria of 10 -3 fatality/year and 10 -4 fatality/year for maximu m to lerable risks to workers and the public, respectively, and 10 -6 fatality/year for broadly acceptable (or negligible) risk to workers and public. Apportioning plant risk criteria to individual scenarios must address a reasonable basis for assessing the contribution of individual scenarios to the risk of the whole facility. By assuming that the contributions of all scenarios are additive [4, 23, 25] , the total ind ividual risk may be defined as the sum of risk contributions fro m many scenarios (e.g. fire, explosion, to xic releases...). So, risk criterion for a single scenario can be derived as follows:
where RC s is the risk criterion for a scenario S; TRC is the total risk criterion; N s is the number of scenarios.
Reducing the actual risk to a tolerable level is ensured by a risk reduction factor (RRF) derived fro m the reverse value of the PFD of an IPL. When C i f exceed ma ximu m tolerable risk frequency, noted TR, PFD PL is a variable given by:
and RRF PL can be derived as:
The ratio TR 2) Expert judg ment method is needed when specific risk tolerance criteria are not availab le due to the novelty of process or its complexity [4] . Referring to their own experience, experts compare IPLs and other features of the scenarios to industry practice or similar processes.
III. Uncertainty in Process Industry
Risk assessment is a measuring process through which measurement error and uncertainty arise as a result of the limitation of the measuring tool, the measuring procedure, and the person performing the measurement. System co mplexity does increase behaviour uncertainty, since both theoretical and empirical models fail to take into account some relevant phenomena including their regimes, the mechanisms and the values of parameters, and may be based on a wide range of assumptions subject to uncertainty [5] [6] [7] 26] . Furthermore, operating environment of systems is constantly changing.
Historical data on failure frequency of the system and its defence are lacking. A typical example is the safety instrumented system (SIS) working in lo w-demand mode of operation which is the most common mode in processes . Demands to activate a safety instrumented function of the SIS are infrequent (less than once per year) and SIS co mponents have not been operating long enough to provide reliable failu re data. So, the use of historical experience is not obvious when dealing with rare failure [16, 26, 27] .
Some assumptions are employed in setting risk scores when statistical data are unreliab le or unavailable. The most known is "uncertainty increases risk". This is a conservative approach requiring that risk should be overestimated by assuming unfavourable conditions. This approach enhances risk assessment cred ibility, especially for public, but it results in higher exp loitation and maintenance costs.
Another approach, may be the optimal, is to deal carefully with the state of "no or bad informat ion" by co nsidering a range of risk scores. It seems that sufficient robustness in the outcome frequency may not be attained by using single values (often means or pessimistic values). For many systems it is often difficult to deal with initiat ing event frequency and IPLs PFD as exact values due to the uncertainty associated with co mponent failure data [10] . Thus, decision making might be based on pessimistic and/or optimistic criteria according to the overall level of system safety [26] .
IV. Fuzzy LOPA Model
Fuzzy set theory [28] has emerged as a very appropriate tool in dealing with uncertainty in reliability and safety analysis. Several fu zzy models concerning fau lt tree analysis (FTA), event tree analysis (ETA), failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FM ECA), risk graph method, ... have been developed to deal with the behaviour of systems which are too co mplex o r too illdefined to ad mit of conventional quantitative techniques [9] [10] [11] , [20, 29] . Imperfect data are dealt with in a natural and flexib le way by using fu zzy ru les -based systems and/or fuzzy arithmetic. In this context, Markowski and Mannan [12] have developed a fuzzy approach of LOPA to assess the risk of pipes. The model takes into account the outcome frequency, the consequence severity and the level of risk. The frequency is calculated using fuzzy multip licat ion. The severity is considered as a variab le by introducing a severity reduction index derived fro m a fu zzy inference system. The risk level is determined fro m a fu zzy risk matrix as a fuzzy in ference system. As an encouraging result, risk values are more accurate than those given by classical LOPA. In the present paper, the proposed fuzzy LOPA model belongs to what could be called "Fuzzy Quantitative Risk Analysis" (FQRA). The overall procedure of fu zzy LOPA model is shown in Fig. 2 . Co mparing to Markowski and Mannan's model, there are two main differences: 1) the risk is exp ressed as a frequency of an unwanted consequence. Thus, risk criteria are based on a maximu m tolerable risk frequency rather than on risk matrix. 2) Risk reduction is dealt with by the model, by considering a possibilistic risk reduction approach. The main steps of the fuzzy model are discussed below.
Fuzzification
The first step is to fuzzify crisp values and/or intervals provided by literature, databases and/or expert judgment using possibility or fu zzy probability concept [17, 20] . The possibility is a fu zzy set defined in probability space. In this paper, the possibilit ies of failure are fuzzy nu mbers defined on [0, 1] and with triangular membe rship functions, as shown in Fig. 3 . The modal value m where µ(m)=1 corresponds to the value totally possible. The triangular representation leads to a reasonable approximat ion of the membership of the fuzzy ou tcome frequency, as discussed in the last step of the model.
A fuzzy nu mber may be deco mposed into its -level sets, called -cuts, through the resolution identity [30] . Let P and  P be a fu zzy number and its -cuts, respectively. Then:
Calculation of fuzzy frequency
This calculation is based on extension principle [30] . In practice, the implementation of calculation procedure is not trivial since it corresponds to a non-linear programming problem. It is easy to show that fuzzy arithmet ic operations are equivalent to the corresponding interval arith metic operations for each -cut with 01. This method provides a discrete but exact solution to the extended operations in a very efficient and simple manner [31] . 
Comparison wi th the Maxi mum Tolerable Risk Frequency
Risk reduction decision is based on comparing calculated frequency C i f with maximu m tolerable frequency TR (Section 2.3). When dealing with single values, this comparison is a straightforward question obeying to the relation (3). But when comparing fuzzy quantities it is sometimes difficult to claim that a fu zzy value is greater or smaller than another. The only case where we can say that a fuzzy number Ã is less than or equal to a fuzzy number B , B A , is in which Fig. 4 . Nu merous research works have been devoted to the problem of ranking fuzzy quantities. A review of the different methods is given in [32] [33] [34] .
In the framewo rk of possibility theory [17, 18] , fro m a possibility distribution, one can define different uncertainty measures to characterize a given event. A poss ibility distribution is a mapp ing  fro m a universe of d iscourse Given a fuzzy set Ã of U and the distribution possibility X  which takes values in U, the possibility and necessity (certainty) measures of Ã , denoted by  and , respectively, are defined by [18] :
where Ã is the complement of Ã . 
, respectively, and defined by [34] : (14) and are depicted in Fig. 5 . 
Risk Reduction
The decision regarding risk fall into one of the fo llowing categories: 1) Continue the safety management systems (SMS) that maintain the risk at its current level (assumed to be tolerable). 2) M itigate the risk to make it tolerable by adding further safety barriers .
3) The risk is so high that it requires changes in the process design or the elimination of procedures and operations.
Much of the decision making in the real-life applications takes place in a fuzzy environ ment [35, 36] . This refers to a decision process in which the goals and/or the constraints are imprecise and/or uncertain. In quantitative risk assessment (QRA), the choice of any risk-based decision main ly depends on the results derived from the comparison of the calculated risk with the maximu m tolerable risk. However, risk experts are usually consulted when risk criteria are not available or ill-specified [4] .
Layers of Protection Analysis Using Possibility Theory In our context, fu zziness in risk decision making is related to the fuzzy outcome frequency which is a crit ical parameter in risk reduction. We mu st deal with the fuzzy inequality A problem of the type: "the risk per scenario must be substantially less than TR" should be solved. One looks for determining satisfactory results instead of an optimal solution for this problem.
Fuzzy mathemat ical programming is developed for treating decisions in a fuzzy environ ment. Fu zzy decision-making supplies a natural framework to deal with vague concepts like bigger, smaller, satisfactory, adequate, etc. Fuzzy decision-making was initially developed by Bellman and Zadeh [35] . They considered the decision-making problem under fuzzy goals and constraints which are defined as fuzzy sets in the space of alternatives. Fro m possibility theory, another type of fuzzy programming is developed [37] . It treats amb iguous and imprecise coefficients of objective functions and constraints. Possibilistic dec ision-making selects fro m a set of possibility distributions given the available information.
A fuzzy constraint which is a fu zzy event may be satisfied with certain predefined possibility and/or necessity degrees [37, 38] . In LOPA, these possibility and necessity constraints may be imposed according to the company's safety policy. The proposed possibilistic risk decision-making aims to reduce the fuzzy outcome frequency under a necessity constraint. This approach may refer to the concept of "necessary risk reduction" as defined by the IEC 61511 standard [3] .
We consider the risk situation in which TR f C i  .
The risk function to be minimized may be written as: , we arrived at:
The RRF may be a practicable decision variable. The relation (18) can write also as:
So, MRRF depends on  value. More this value increases more the investment in risk reduction becomes important. The reduced frequency * i f is calculated fro m equation (15) by using -cut method. 
Description of the Process
To demonstrate the applicability of the proposed fuzzy LOPA approach, our case study has focused on a heater of the MPP3-p lant at Hassi R'Mel (South Algeria). The heater is one of the most crit ical systems in the gas treatment process and is able to generate catastrophic consequences on the persons, assets and environment.
The MPP3-p lant recuperates heavy hydrocarbons (condensed and LPG) of crude gases fro m many o il wells to produce treated gases (gas for sale or reinjection gas). The process of gas treatment is based on: 1) Cooling gas by thermal exchange and simp le relaxation (adiabatic). 2) Addit ional relaxation through turboexpander (isentropic). 3) Final temperature (-40°C). This process allo ws a better recuperation of liquid hydrocarbons, starting by pre-separation of crude gas coming fro m wells and its compression on the boosting station at a pressure of 117 kg/cm² and a temperature of 62°C. In h igh pressure separation section, the recovered liquid hydrocarbons are separated as a liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and condensed in the deethanisor C102 of the fractionation section. After extract ing light constitutions in the deethanizer C101 (co mposed of 28 valves), the accumulating plate separates these two parts. To avoid the formation of the hydrates in the upper part of the column C101, a glycol solution which is extracted fro m the accumulating plate is injected in the flow pipe. The separated liquid hydrocarbons are sent towards the highest plate of the lower part of C101. A part of these hydrocarbons is sent by means of pu mps 31-P101 A and B towards the heater H101 fo r reheating at 150 °C. The flow hydrocarbon is regulated by the motorized regulating valve FICA 136. The outgoing fluid fro m of the heater at about 180°C is driven towards the column C101 in order to extract light fuel gases (gas of sale).
Our study particularly focuses on the heater H101 which represents critical equip ment in the production of the light fuel gases (gas for sale) wh ich are co mposed of methane and ethane.
Accident Scenarios and Safeguard Analysis
Identifying accident scenarios is a preliminary step in LOPA. Representative accident scenarios (RAS) are selected according to risk criteria established by SONATRA CH co mpany [39] .We are interested with scenarios that have the potential to result in release of flammable material and production loses. HAZOP study was performed to identify this kind of scenarios. Table 1 shows three potential scenarios with their causes and consequences. It should be noticed that initiating and top events in the event trees are well defined.
In order to reduce risks generated by these RAS, several IPLs are imp lemented. Conventional LOPA method allo ws the analysis of the d ifferent IPLs. Fig. 8a, 8b and 8c show the event trees of these scenarios. SONATRA CH Co mpany has retained the value of 10 -5 /year as a maximu m tolerable frequency for accident scenarios resulting in more than one fatality on site [39] .
Failure data
Except for safety instrumented systems (SISs), uncertainty of failure probabilities is represented by considering fuzzy numbers as mentioned in section 4.1. Confidence intervals provided by experts or taken fro m databases and literature [13, 15, 39, 40] are converted to fu zzy numbers by calcu lating quadratic mean value of interval boundaries. Triangular membership functions are chosen because they allow simple calcu lations of fuzzy frequency outcomes. The average PFD of a safety function achieved by a SIS characterizes its safety integrity level (SIL) and is represented by an interval according to the IEC 61511 standard [3] , with the interpretation that co mpletely possible values are within this interval, i.e.
for all p belonging to this interval. For the heater H101, the imp lemented SISs operate in low demand mode of operation (less than once per year) and are designed to achieve SIL2.
Results and Discussion
Comparison of fuzzy frequencies a nd maximum tolerable frequency
The fu zzy frequencies of the three scenarios are ca lculated using equation (8) and a discretization of the membership functions of input data. Only eleven nested intervals (i.e. endecadarum system) are considered in the calculation [31] . Table 3 -No fuel gas in furnace H-101, lower pressure and temperature of fuel gas outside the heater H-101, product off-spec.
-Fuel gas release in atmosphere, able to cause fire and process shutdown. 
Reduction of Consequence frequencies under necessity constraint
Referring to the relat ion (19) , it can be seen that we need the value of the confidence level  to calculate MRRF. 0.5 seems to be a reasonable hypothetic value for three reasons: 1) as a value d ifferent to zero it perfectly guarantees the optimistic criterion based on the possibility measure, i.e . 2) it refers to the central point in the interval [0, 1] which corresponds to 50% of certainty. 3) it allows the necessity constraint as a pessimistic criterion to be moderate and therefore, both technological and financial constraints would not be an obstacle in necessary risk reduction.
MRRFs for the specified scenarios are given by table 5 and reduced frequencies under necessity constraint are shown in Fig. 10a, 10b and 10c . Note that C f 1 and * 1 f are trapezoidal, except that they are plotted on logarithmic scale. As we can see, the results are in concordance with the results of table 4 wh ich are based on the position of the estimated fu zzy frequencies against TR. Indeed, more the decrease part of the fuzzy frequency moves away fro m TR, more the MRRF value increases. MRRF for the scenario 1 is the highest; scenario 2 requires a MRRF not far away fro m the first. Scenario 3 may represent the best of the three scenarios since it only requires a low M RRF, namely M RRF2, to meet TR. Table 6 shows possibility and necessity measures when considering fu zzy frequencies reduced under necessity constraint. Co mpared to the results of table 4, it can be seen that all the possibility measures are equal to 1 and all the necessity measures have increased considerably (0.5 is the min imu m value). Th is result might be suitable for necessary risk reduction.
Consideration of practical aspects
For fu rther validation of the proposed approach, we have attempted to consider some pract ical aspects which could improve the safety integrity of protection layers and reduce therefore the consequence frequencies. For each scenario it was question to min imize either the initiating event frequency or the PFD of one IPL based on judgements of process experts. Table 7 shows the modifications provided by these experts and their effects. Both consequence frequencies reduced under necessity constraint (may be qualified as theoretical) and those issued from practical modifications are represented in figures 11a, 11b and 11c. Fro m the results of table 8, we can say that for the scenarios 1 and 2, fuzzy frequencies related to pract ical considerations are between the estimated (or in itial) fuzzy frequencies and the theoretical ones. Note that the possibility measure is still equal to 1 for all the scenarios. This result is compatible with an optimistic risk reduction. On the other hand, necessity measure has considerably decreased, namely 0 and 0.22 versus 0.5 and 0.71, respectively. Necessary risk reduction is somewhat carried out for scenario 2 and it could However, for scenario 1 it seems clearly that modif ications suggested by experts are not enough and further improvements are needed. Further improving the SIL of SIF associated with the SIS FZA L137, we reco mmend also the reduction of the init iating event frequency, i.e. valve failure frequency, by adding a redundant valve. For scenario 3 (Fig. 11c) , p ractical modifications have resulted in net reduction, i.e. fu zzy consequence frequency due to practical modifications is less than the theoretical one, with a necessity measure equal to 1 (compared to 0.62 for theoretical fuzzy frequency). Therefore, we think that theoretical MRRF is so low (equal to 2) that it would be difficu lt to propose an ad equate technical improvement. Therefore, co mpared to TR, the in itial fu zzy frequency, C f 3 , may be accepted as it is without immediate action.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a fuzzy LOPA model with four main characteristics: 1) The use of fuzzy probabilities or fuzzy frequencies to represent input data.
2) The use of fuzzy arith metic to calculate the fuzzy outcome frequencies. 3) Co mparison of these frequencies with maximu m tolerable frequency by using poss ibility and necessity measures. 4) Application of necessary risk reduction via a possibilistic risk decision-making. For the latter, we have resolved a risk reduction problem under a necessity constraint.
A case study concerning a heater in a gas treatment process has shown the great applicability of the proposed approach and the results are encouraging. Referring to three accident scenarios with frequencies ranging fro m intolerab le to almost tolerable, we have seen how the MRRF varies according to the d ifference between fuzzy frequencies and tolerable frequency. Furthermore, practical modificat ions as proposed by experts have shown the potential of the proposed approach in evaluating expert judgments.
In this paper, results can be viewed in so me sense as partial. We believe that fuzzification stage needs more development, especially when dealing with single values and/or large intervals. A second problem concerns the choice of the confidence level, , in necessary risk reduction and its relationship with A LARP principle. The question is wh ich  value satisfies A LARP demonstration?
Beyond this kind o f questions, we believe that fu zzy LOPA model might be an extension of conventional LOPA which can be applied successfully outside the probabilistic framework.
